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Abstract
This paper analyzes blindfolded versus informed ultimatum bargaining where pro-
poser and responder are both either uninformed or informed about the size of the
pie. Analyzing the transition from one information setting to the other suggests
that more information induces lower (higher) price oﬀers and acceptance thresholds
when the pie is small (large). While our experimental data confirm this transition
eﬀect, risk aversion leads to diverging results in blindfolded ultimatum bargain-
ing due to task-independent strategies such as ‘equal sharing’ or the ‘golden mean.’
The probability of successful bargaining is lower in case of blindfolded than informed
ultimatum bargaining.
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1. Introduction
In ultimatum bargaining, proposer and responder can share an exogenously given
monetary reward, the pie. The proposer makes a ‘take it or leave it’ oﬀer to the
responder who can accept or reject it. In the latter case, the pie is lost, otherwise it
is distributed as proposed. In our setup the pie is a random surplus from bargaining.
Both, the proposer and the responder, are either informed or not informed about
the surplus. In the latter case, however, the distribution generating this value is
commonly known.
When proposer and responder are both informed about the surplus from trade,
they find themselves in the classical ultimatum bargaining situation, as originally
analyzed by Gu¨th et al. (1982). While being informed about the surplus from
trade might be typical for many bargaining situations (e.g., when selling a well-
established firm in a traditional industry), this becomes questionable in case of,
e.g., selling a start-up firm in a newly developing industry. In the latter case,
neither the potential buyer (proposer) nor the potential seller (responder) will know
the surplus from trade with certainty. In our setup, we compare both situations:
ultimatum bargaining between parties who both know the value of the surplus
from trade (informed ultimatum bargaining) and ultimatum bargaining between
players when neither party knows that value with certainty (‘blindfolded’ ultimatum
bargaining). In a within-subject design, we do not only compare blindfolded and
informed ultimatum bargaining but also analyze the eﬀect of a transition from one to
the other, i.e., we analyze what happens if buyer and seller become informed about
the surplus from trade as, for instance, when an industry matures and information
on the value of the traded firm becomes publicly available.
To the best of our knowledge, ultimatum bargaining among mutually uninformed
players has not yet been studied. The same is true for the transition eﬀect due to
becoming informed in ultimatum bargaining between originally uninformed players.
So far both, the theoretical and the experimental literature, have concentrated on
asymmetric information settings where either the responder or the proposer is not
informed about the size of the pie. Samuelson and Bazerman (1985), Mitzkewitz and
Nagel (1993), Croson (1996), Rapoport and Sundali (1996), Chlass (2013) and Lee
and Lau (2013) model ultimatum bargaining when only the proposer is informed.
Likewise, previous experimental work by Ball et al. (1991), Foreman and Murnighan
(1996), Harstad and Nagel (2004), Grosskopf et al. (2007), and Dittrich et al. (2012)
focuses on a situation where only the responder is informed. Klempt and Pull
(2012) and Gu¨th et al. (2014) each analyze both cases of asymmetric information.
Furthermore, Gu¨th et al. (2014) study the transition from either case of asymmetric
information to one where both players are informed. Contributing to this strand
of literature, we analyze a setting where both, proposer and responder, are not
informed about the size of the pie, i.e., both are ‘blindfolded,’ and analyze the
transition to a setting where both are informed.
We proceed as follows: section 2 introduces the theoretical model and derives hy-
potheses to be tested with the help of experimental data. The experimental design
and setup are described in section 3. The main findings are illustrated and statis-
tically analyzed in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2. The theoretical model
The game involves proposer P , the potential buyer, and responder R, the potential
seller.1 The proposer valuates the commodity by v ∈ (0, 1), and the responder
valuates it by qv, where q ∈ (0, 1) is exogenously given and commonly known. Thus
both valuations are perfectly correlated. Due to q < 1, successful bargaining, i.e.,
trade, is always welfare enhancing. The proposer oﬀers a price p for the commodity
to the responder who then either accepts or rejects the oﬀer. Defining δ(p) = 1(0)
when the responder accepts (rejects) the oﬀered price p, the gains from trade are
δ(p)(v−p) for P and δ(p)(p−qv) for R. Total surplus thus amounts to δ(p)(1−q)v,
i.e., (1 − q)v is the size of the pie.
We distinguish two information settings, blindfolded ultimatum bargaining B (both
players do not know the realization of the random variable v) and informed ulti-
matum bargaining I (both are informed about v) and assume the random vari-
able v—determining the size of the pie—to be uniformly distributed on the unit
interval (0, 1) what is commonly known.
Scenario B—blindfolded ultimatum bargaining: proposer P and responderR
are not informed about the realization of value v but of its mean of 1/2.
The responder’s expected payoﬀ in case of δ(p) = 1 is
EπR(p) = p− q/2.
If risk neutral, the responder should accept (δ∗ (p) = 1) only if p ≥ q/2.
1Specifically, we modify the ‘acquiring-a-company’ setting, introduced by Samuelson and Baz-
erman (1985), by not assuming the seller to be better informed than the buyer.
3
The proposer expects the payoﬀ
EπP (p) = 1/2− p
in case of trade. If the proposer is risk neutral as well, his optimal oﬀer is pB = q/2.
This implies a gain for the responder in case of v < 1/2, but a loss in case of v > 1/2.
Given risk neutrality, the commodity will be traded, and the expected gains from
trade for the proposer and the responder are
EπBP = (1 − q)/2 and Eπ
B
R = 0 .
Proposer P exploits ultimatum power and acquires the total expected surplus (1−
q)/2 from trade. As benchmark predictions we will thus test
Hypothesis 1a. In blindfolded ultimatum bargaining, the proposer oﬀers price pB =
q/2, and
Hypothesis 1b. In blindfolded ultimatum bargaining, the responder only accepts
price oﬀers pB ≥ q/2.
The second scenario maintains that v is randomly generated. However, the size of
the pie is announced to proposer and responder before negotiating.
Scenario I—informed ultimatum bargaining: the realization of value v is
commonly known when bargaining takes place.
Again the proposer exploits ultimatum power by oﬀering price pI = qv which the
responder accepts. The gains from trade
πIP = (1 − q)/2 and π
I
R = 0
coincide with the expected gains from trade in scenario B : the proposer receives the
whole surplus from trade, (1− q)/2, the payoﬀ for the responder is 0.
Hypothesis 2a. In informed ultimatum bargaining, the proposer oﬀers price pI(v) =
qv for all v ∈ (0, 1), and
Hypothesis 2b. In informed ultimatum bargaining, the responder only accepts
price oﬀers pI(v) ≥ qv.
The hypotheses stated so far further imply
Hypothesis 3. In both scenarios (B and I) price oﬀers and acceptance thresh-
olds increase in q. In informed ultimatum bargaining (scenario I), price oﬀers and
acceptance thresholds increase (linearly) in v.
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Both scenarios, B and I, suggest that price oﬀers are increasing in the level of q. In
scenario I, value v determines the strength of the q-dependency: for v > 1/2 the
price oﬀered in scenario I increases more than in scenario B; for v ≤ 1/2, however,
the price oﬀered in scenario B increases more. In case of v ≤ 1/2, the optimal
oﬀer in scenario B is therefore higher than the one in scenario I, whereas in case of
v > 1/2, the optimal oﬀer is higher in scenario I. The same applies to responders’
acceptance thresholds.
Hypothesis 5. Becoming informed about v induces higher (lower) price oﬀers and
acceptance thresholds than in the blindfolded setting when v > 1/2 (v ≤ 1/2).
The expected surplus from trade is identical in both settings irrespective of infor-
mation about v. From a cognitive perspective, however, blindfolded ultimatum
bargaining seems more complex: knowing v, participants do not have to cope with
risk, and the surplus from trade is less ambiguous. Therefore, one should expect
successful bargaining to be more likely when value v, determining the size of the
pie, is common knowledge. Since we experimentally implement the transition from
uninformed to informed participants, we can specifically compare whether infor-
mation about the size of the pie fosters successful bargaining as measured by the
probability of acceptance δ(p).
Hypothesis 6. Becoming informed about v increases the probability of successful
ultimatum bargaining.
Concerning risk attitude we expect that it aﬀects behavior only in case of blindfolded
ultimatum bargaining.
Hypothesis 7a. Risk attitude should aﬀect behavior only in blindfolded ultimatum
bargaining (scenario B).
Given our experimental framing of eliciting price oﬀers and acceptance thresholds,
predictions regarding the eﬀect of risk attitude on price oﬀers and acceptance thresh-
olds are somewhat complex. In their seminal contribution Holt and Laury (2002)
define risk aversion in the sense of trying to avoid negative expected payoﬀs. How-
ever, in our experimental setup of eliciting minimum selling and maximum buying
prices the impact of risk attitude is not straightforward. While proposers increase
the probability of successful bargaining by high price oﬀers, such high price oﬀers at
the same time yield lower payoﬀs when bargaining is successful. Thus, risk attitude
can have countervailing eﬀects which partly overlap with loss aversion. Kachelmeier
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and Shehata (1992) point out that the elicitation of minimum selling prices induces
a form of loss aversion which can lead risk-averse individuals to choose risk-neutral
or risk-seeking (higher) acceptance thresholds. To disentangle both eﬀects we dis-
tinguish the risk of (bargaining) failure from the risk of incurring losses: failure-risk
averse subjects aim to render bargaining successful and loss-risk averse subjects
aim to avoid negative payoﬀs. This distinction leads to the following hypotheses
Hypothesis 7b. Failure-risk averse subjects choose higher price oﬀers and lower
acceptance thresholds.
Hypothesis 7c. Loss-risk averse subjects choose lower price oﬀers and higher ac-
ceptance thresholds.
In light of the strong experimental evidence highlighting the importance of behav-
ioral motives in bargaining situations, we also add a prediction based on inequality
aversion, namely that responders reject ‘too low’ price oﬀers and proposers oﬀer
‘fairer’ prices. One can justify the latter either by proposers anticipating respon-
ders’ inequality aversion or by own intrinsic inequality aversion of proposers (see,
e.g., Bolton and Ockenfels, 1998, 2000, and Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). Strong fairness
concerns induced by inequality aversion lead to equal sharing, e.g., equal expected
payoﬀs of proposer and responder. Thus, inequality aversion could lead participants
to rely on a task-independent ‘equal sharing’ strategy which would render all price
oﬀers leading to unequal sharing of the pie as unfair. An alternative could be to
reduce cognitive eﬀort by simply choosing the midpoint of all possible values (i.e.,
the ‘golden mean’), similar to ‘level-0’ behavior in guessing games (see Nagel, 1995).
Either behavioral strategy could reflect an unwillingness to engage in more or less
complex considerations regarding the experimental task(s). Additionally, in case of
blindfolded ultimatum bargaining such task-independent strategies could simply be
a response to lack of information providing possible guidance of what to choose. We
therefore expect
Hypothesis 8. Behavioral strategies such as ‘equal sharing’, due to inequality aver-
sion, as well as the ‘golden mean’ strategy are especially relevant in blindfolded ul-
timatum bargaining.
3. Experimental design and setup
Ultimatum bargaining is framed as an ‘acquiring-a-company’ game: a potential
buyer (proposer P ) oﬀers a price p for a commodity owned by a potential seller
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(responder R), who chooses an acceptance threshold, i.e., we implemented the
(monotonic) strategy method.2 By asking responders for their acceptance thresh-
olds instead of confronting them with only one specific proposer’s price oﬀer, we
purposefully deviate from our theoretical model to gather more informative data
allowing a more detailed analysis of responder behavior. Note, however, that the
sequential-move equilibrium evolves as one out of a continuum of possible equilib-
ria in the experimentally implemented simultaneous-move game. Participants were
randomly assigned to one of the two roles and remained in that role. To study the
transition from scenario B to scenario I in a within-subject design, we divided each
session into two phases: In phase 1, participants played three rounds of scenario B,
followed by three rounds of scenario I in phase 2.
The instructions for the first phase were handed out at the beginning of a session,
the instructions for the second phase only after phase 1 had ended. Participants
played six rounds altogether. In the three rounds of each phase, participants faced
a random sequence of three diﬀerent levels of q with q = {0.35, 0.45, 0.55}. They
were informed about the q−level prior to choosing their price oﬀer (acceptance
threshold) in both scenarios where, in scenario B, value v was unknown (the level of
q, however, was still common knowledge). Consequently, throughout the experiment
knowing value v was equivalent to knowing the size of the pie. In phase 2, informed
ultimatum bargaining, P− and R−participants were successively confronted with
15 randomly drawn realizations of v ∈ [0, 100] to observe how diﬀerent pie sizes
aﬀect behavior. The realizations of v, including their order of appearance as well
the order of the three q−levels, were randomly drawn before the experiment started
and kept constant across all sessions.3
In phase 2, informed P− and R−participants stated a price oﬀer, respectively an
acceptance threshold, in the range of 0 to 100 for every v: P−participants stated the
price at which they would buy the commodity (buyer price BP ), R−participants
stated the minimum price for which they would sell the commodity, i.e., their ac-
ceptance threshold (seller price SP ). If BP exceeded the seller’s acceptance thresh-
old SP , the commodity was sold at the oﬀered price BP , i.e., δ(BP ) = 1, otherwise
2In a survey of experimental comparisons between the strategy and direct-response method,
Brandts and Charness (2011) report diﬀerences in experimental results only for four out of nine-
teen experimental comparisons. All treatment eﬀects found using the strategy method were also
observed using the direct-response method.
3See the appendix for the instructions (appendix A) as well as the realizations of q and v in
the experiment (appendix B).
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bargaining failed, δ(BP ) = 0. The resulting payoﬀs, δ(BP )(v − BP ) for the pro-
poser and δ(BP )(BP − qv) for the responder, were described formally as well as
verbally in the instructions.
In scenario I, played in phase 2 of the experiment, informed participants made
altogether 45 decisions, corresponding to the 15 v−realizations in each of the three
rounds. In scenario B, played in phase 1 of the experiment, participants were not
informed about v; however, q was commonly announced. Participants made only
one choice per round: uninformedR−participants stated their acceptance threshold,
uninformed P−participants chose a price oﬀer.
There was no feedback between rounds. At the end of the experiment, we randomly
matched each P−participant with an R−participant and chose one v− realization
for each round as relevant for payment, i.e., participants were paid for altogether
six decisions.
All sessions started with a set of control questions concerning decision tasks and
payoﬀs. To emphasize that negative payoﬀs were possible, an appropriate example
was included in the control questions. After all participants had answered all control
questions correctly, three trial rounds including feedback to participants took place
to ensure that they understood the consequences of their decisions. After the six
rounds, participants were asked to fill out a postexperimental questionnaire.
Throughout the experiment, payoﬀs were calculated in Experimental Currency
Units (ECU) and converted into euros at a given and known exchange rate (6 ECU
= 1 euro). Besides a show-up fee of 5 euros, participants received their payoﬀ earned
according to six randomly drawn decisions (one from each of the 6 rounds) as well
as the reward for a lottery question on risk tolerance (Holt and Laury, 2002) in the
postexperimental questionnaire. The experiment was programmed in z-tree (Fisch-
bacher, 2007). We ran three sessions, two with 32 and one with 30 participants.
Participants were students of Friedrich Schiller University Jena (Germany). On
average, sessions lasted about 90 minutes, and payments to participants amounted,
on average, to 16.32 euros and ranged from 6.60 to 55.40 euros.
When payoﬀs (exclusive of participation fees and rewards for the lottery questions)
summed up to a negative value, participants could choose to either pay their debt
out of pocket or to work it oﬀ by completing an eﬀort task (counting the letter ‘t’
in a text). Of the 13 (13.8%) participants confronted with negative payoﬀs all chose
to work oﬀ their debt.4
4For every correctly completed exercise, participants could work oﬀ 5 euros. A negative payoﬀ
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4. Experimental results
A first glimpse at our data suggests that blindfolded ultimatum bargaining leads to
higher price oﬀers and acceptance thresholds as compared to bargaining with com-
plete information. Figure 1 depicts univariate kernel density estimations for both
treatments, distinguishing between proposers choosing a price oﬀer and responders
choosing acceptance thresholds.5
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Figure 1: Price oﬀers and acceptance thresholds in scenarios I and B
While we observe a single peak at the center of possible choices, 50, in the case
of blindfolded decisions, price oﬀers and acceptance thresholds both decrease and
show a larger variance when participants become informed. As will be investigated
in more detail below, this is caused by informed participants being more prone
to implement task-specific strategies, therefore acting more sensitive to parame-
ter q. Figure 2 depicts kernel density estimations separately for the three diﬀerent
could not be compensated by the show-up fee or the reward for the lottery question in the postex-
perimental questionnaire. Consequently, if participants chose to work oﬀ their debt, they received
a positive payoﬀ consisting solely of the show-up fee and the reward for the lottery question.
5All presented kernel density estimations are carried out using the Epanechnikov kernel function
with a bandwidth of 5.
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q−levels. These simple descriptive results suggest that q−levels may indeed play a
substantial role. Take, e.g., the highest q−level, 0.55: for informed and blindfolded
ultimatum bargaining, the variance of price oﬀers and acceptance thresholds in-
creases relative to lower q−levels, where the eﬀect is apparently larger for informed
ultimatum bargaining.
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Figure 2: Price oﬀers and acceptance thresholds for alternative q−levels
4.1. Bargaining for a random surplus from trade: Scenario B
To test Hypotheses 1a and 1b, we investigate whether decisions in blindfolded ulti-
matum bargaining are close to the theoretical benchmark.6 After calculating opti-
mal price oﬀers and acceptance thresholds for every decision, we conduct Wilcoxon
matched-pairs signed-rank tests to compare (hypothetical) optimal choices to actual
ones. We find price oﬀers on a 1% significance level higher than the benchmark for
6We do so by relying on generic predictions related to ϵ-equilibria (see Radner, 1980) tolerating
deviations from benchmark payoﬀs yielding ε less than predicted by optimality. For an illustration,
consider the benchmark solution for round 1 where q = 0.55. The optimal price oﬀer would be
p∗ = 27.5, yielding a payoﬀ of 22.5 for P . A 10% variation allows payoﬀ reductions up to 2.25.
This is fulfilled for 25.25 ≤ pϵ ≤ 29.75. As participants could only choose integer values, we
considered the span from 25 up to 30 as being (nearly) optimal.
all levels of q, i.e., Hypothesis 1a predicting optimal price oﬀers in scenario B is
rejected.
Regarding responder behavior, Hypothesis 1b predicts that only suﬃciently high
oﬀers should be accepted. Proceeding as before, we use a Wilcoxon matched-pairs
signed-rank test which shows that acceptance thresholds are significantly higher
than the benchmark for all levels of q (p-value< 0.01). Thus Hypothesis 1b is also
rejected.
For all levels of q, the theoretical benchmark is not chosen frequently. The total
frequency of near-optimal price oﬀers and acceptance thresholds is 9 out of 87
in round 1 (corresponding to a share of 10.34%), 5 in round 2 (5.7%), and 7 in
round 3 (8.0%). Potential behavioral explanations for the observed behavior might
be ‘equal sharing’ and the ‘golden mean.’ Using expected payoﬀs, sharing equally
requires price pe = (1+q)25, whereas the ‘golden mean’ in our experimental setting
is 50. Table 1 summarizes the respective predictions of equal sharing and golden
mean together with the theoretical benchmark and the mean values of BP and SP
in the experiment, distinguishing between the three possible (and throughout the
experiment commonly known) levels of q.
q−level 0.35 0.45 0.55
Mean value BP 39.19 40.32 42.12
Mean value SP 39.02 44.30 45.15
Theoretical benchmark 17.50 22.50 27.50
Equal sharing 33.75 36.25 38.75
Golden mean 50.00 50.00 50.00
Table 1: Mean values BP , SP , theoretical benchmark, and values for alternative behavioral
strategies in scenario B
Average choices in the blindfolded ultimatum game, BP and SP , lie between equal
sharing and golden mean and—as reported earlier—exceed the theoretical bench-
mark solutions. Table 2 reports frequencies of decisions following either the bench-
mark, equal sharing, or the golden mean, allowing for a 10% deviation from the
values reported in Table 1.
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q−level 0.35 0.45 0.55
Theoretical benchmark 5.7 8.0 10.34
Equal sharing 18.4 12.6 23.0
Golden mean 21.8 39.1 27.6
Table 2: Relative frequencies (%) of alternative strategies in scenario B
Regarding Hypothesis 3, we estimate the impact of parameter q on price oﬀers and
acceptance thresholds. As q−levels were varied within subjects, we estimate a linear
fixed eﬀects model, thereby controlling for unobserved time-constant characteristics
of individual subjects. Results are reported in Table 3.
Price oﬀers BP Acceptance thresholds SP
Variable Coeﬃcient (Std. Err.) Coeﬃcient (Std. Err.)
q 14.634 (10.279) 30.652∗∗ (13.446)
Constant 33.959∗∗∗ (4.626) 29.033∗∗∗ (6.051)
Observations 123 138
R2 0.022 0.085
Significance levels : ∗ 10% ∗∗ 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ 1%
Robust standard errors
Table 3: Eﬀect of q−level on price oﬀers and acceptance thresholds in scenario B (fixed eﬀects)
Estimation results suggest that the q−level has a significantly positive eﬀect only
on acceptance thresholds SP , whereas there is no significant correlation between q
and price oﬀers BP . Recall that the (ex post) gains from trade are v −BP for the
proposer and BP−qv for the responder. The result that only responder decisions are
aﬀected by diﬀerent q−levels suggests that participants base their decisions mainly
on their own payoﬀs: responders increase acceptance thresholds with q−levels to
ensure a positive payoﬀ, whereas proposers—given that their (ex post) payoﬀs do
not directly depend on q—are not significantly aﬀected by changes in q. Participants
apparently often neglect how q aﬀects the strategy of their bargaining partner. In
the case at hand proposers do not account for the fact that responders increase
acceptance thresholds in response to higher q−levels. In summary, these results
suggest
Result 1. In blindfolded ultimatum bargaining, proposer and responder behavior
deviates from the benchmark in that proposers oﬀer higher than optimal prices and
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responders choose higher than optimal acceptance thresholds. While—as predicted—
acceptance thresholds increase in q−levels, price oﬀers are not significantly aﬀected
by q.
Regarding risk attitude, Hypothesis 7a predicts that it should aﬀect behavior only
in blindfolded ultimatum bargaining, with Hypotheses 7b and 7c further specifying
the expected eﬀect. To test whether subjects’ (constant) risk attitudes significantly
aﬀect price oﬀers and acceptance thresholds, we estimate an ordinary least squares
(OLS) model, clustering standard errors at the subject level. To measure risk atti-
tude, we use the postexperimental lottery question and follow the instrumentaliza-
tion of risk aversion proposed by Holt and Laury (2002). To allow for the analysis of
possible interaction eﬀects of risk aversion with the participants’ role (proposer or
responder) and with responders’ valuation q we construct a dummy variable RISK,
taking unit value if participants are risk averse, i.e., if they chose a relatively ‘safer’
option more often than a risk neutral subject would have.7 We further include the
dummy variable PROP , taking unit value when a participant is in the role of a
proposer and zero value when a participant is in the role of a responder. By this we
analyze the distinct eﬀect of risk attitude on proposers and responders. When an-
alyzing the joint eﬀect of responders’ valuation and risk aversion (interaction term
RISK∗PROP in regression model II) we use q−level 0.35 as reference category.
Finally, we control for gender eﬀects by including the dummy variable FEMALE.
Table 4 reports our results.
Regression model I in Table 4 suggests that risk aversion does not aﬀect behavior
in blindfolded ultimatum bargaining. However, including interaction eﬀects of risk
aversion and being a proposer as well as risk aversion and the diﬀerent q−levels
(regression model II) reveals that risk attitude does aﬀect behavior: we find a sig-
nificantly negative eﬀect for the RISK dummy and significantly positive eﬀects
for its interaction terms with high q−levels. While being a proposer, PROP , gen-
erally leads to a significantly lower choice, the insignificant eﬀect of interaction
term RISK∗PROP reveals that there is no role-specific eﬀect of risk attitude.
The overall negative eﬀect of risk attitude suggests that responders’ choices are
driven by ‘failure-risk aversion’ leading them to choose lower acceptance thresh-
olds and proposers’ choices by ‘loss-risk aversion’ leading them to choose lower
7Given the setup of Holt and Laury, 2002, this is the case if the safe option is chosen in more
than four out of ten possible choices. We observed non-monotonic risk preferences for seven out
of our 94 participants and dropped these observations.
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(I) (II)
Variable Coeﬃcient (Std. Err.) Coeﬃcient (Std. Err.)
q 2.310∗∗∗ (0.863) -7.170 (5.254)
q = 0.45 -2.667 (2.707)
q = 0.55 -2.000 (2.223)
RISK 2.846 (3.325) -7.774∗∗ (3.557)
PROP -1.625 (3.215) -8.815∗∗ (3.791)
RISK∗q = 0.45 6.947∗∗ (3.094)
RISK∗q = 0.55 7.680∗∗ (2.963)
RISK∗PROP 8.096 (5.203)
FEMALE -1.982 (3.079) -2.122 (3.081)
Constant 36.536∗∗∗ (3.844) 48.152∗∗∗ (2.785)
Observations 261 261
R2 0.023 0.034
Significance levels : ∗ 10% ∗∗ 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ 1%
Standard errors clustered at subject level
Table 4: Eﬀect of risk aversion in scenario B (OLS)
price oﬀers. However, the positive eﬀect of the interaction terms RISK∗q = 0.45
and RISK∗q = 0.55 suggests that for high stakes these eﬀects are reversed: now
‘failure-risk aversion’ prevails for proposers leading them to choose higher price
oﬀers, whereas ‘loss-risk aversion’ prevails for responders leading them to choose
higher acceptance thresholds.
In summary this supports Hypothesis 7a that risk attitude aﬀects decisions in blind-
folded ultimatum bargaining: generally, risk aversion leads to lower prices, whereas
high responder valuations q induce a positive eﬀect: if stakes are high, respon-
ders want to make sure they gain from selling whereas proposers try to assure that
bargaining is successful. We state
Result 2. Risk aversion leads to lower price oﬀers and acceptance thresholds, with
the eﬀect being reversed if responders’ valuation parameter q is high.
4.2. Bargaining for a known surplus from trade: Scenario I
In scenario I, proposer and responder can condition their decisions on value v. To
investigate Hypothesis 2a, predicting exploitative price oﬀers in scenario I, we check
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whether actual and predicted choices are significantly diﬀerent from each other. To
this end, we calculate standard deviations between actual and optimal choices at the
subject level, thereby averaging across the diﬀerent choices made for each of the 15
randomly selected v-values. In a next step, we compare these standard deviations
to the theoretically predicted deviations, namely zero, using Wilcoxon signed ranks
tests. For both, proposers and responders, deviations from the benchmark are
significant at the 1% level, thus rejecting Hypothesis 2a and Hypothesis 2b.8
Result 3. In scenario I, proposer and responder behavior deviates from the theo-
retical benchmark in that proposers oﬀer higher than optimal prices and responders
set higher than optimal acceptance thresholds.
Table 5 summarizes the mean values of BP and SP in the informed ultimatum
game (scenario I). Here average choices lie between the theoretical benchmark and
equal sharing.
q−level 0.35 0.45 0.55
Mean value BP 30.61 30.95 32.04
Mean value SP 31.23 34.18 34.60
Theoretical benchmark 17.50 22.50 27.50
Equal sharing 33.75 36.25 38.75
Golden mean 50.00 50.00 50.00
Table 5: Mean values BP , SP , theoretical benchmark, and values for alternative behavioral
strategies in scenario I
In Table 6 we report relative frequencies of decisions lying within a 10% range of
either the benchmark, equal sharing, or the golden mean.
Experimentally, the ultimatum game has been found to present an especially dif-
q−level 0.35 0.45 0.55
Theoretical benchmark 20.8 5.7 8.4
Equal sharing 8.0 7.6 6.8
Golden mean 12.9 16.8 16.9
Table 6: Relative frequencies (%) of alternative strategies in scenario I
8Proceeding similarly to scenario B conducting Wilcoxon matched-pair signed-rank tests to
compare (hypothetical) optimal choices to actual ones we find price oﬀers as well as acceptance
thresholds are on a 1% significance level higher than the benchmark for all levels of q.
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ficult environment for learning subgame perfection (see Andreoni and Blanchard,
2006), i.e., for learning to choose a low price oﬀer and a low acceptance threshold as
predicted by game theory. In our experiment we observe the frequency with which
the benchmark strategy is chosen in the informed ultimatum game to increase to
20.8% in the final round. Since we held the order of v values and q−levels constant
across sessions (0.45 in round 1, 0.55 in round 2, and 0.35 in round 3 of scenario
I), we cannot exclude that this increase is also caused by learning. However, earlier
findings by Andreoni and Blanchard (2006) as well as further experimental evidence
point to a convergence of ultimatum bargaining over successive rounds towards the
equal split rather than towards the theoretical prediction (see, e.g., Nowak et al.,
2000). We therefore conjecture that our results most likely do not result from learn-
ing eﬀects.
As for blindfolded ultimatum bargaining, regarding Hypothesis 3 we estimate a
linear fixed eﬀects model to investigate the impact of parameter q and additionally
of v on price oﬀers and acceptance thresholds. Results are reported in Table 7.
Price oﬀers BP Acceptance thresholds SP
Variable Coeﬃcient (Std. Err.) Coeﬃcient (Std. Err.)
q 25.052∗∗∗ (2.538) 32.501∗∗∗ (4.085)
v 0.647∗∗∗ (0.016) 0.566∗∗∗ (0.030)
Constant -11.897∗∗∗ (1.346) -9.138∗∗∗ (2.113)
Observations 1845 2070
R2 0.925 0.788
Significance levels : ∗ 10% ∗∗ 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ 1%
Robust standard errors
Table 7: Eﬀect of the q−level on price oﬀers and acceptance thresholds in scenario I (fixed eﬀects)
Estimation results strongly support Hypothesis 3: both, q and v, have a signifi-
cantly positive eﬀect on price oﬀers and acceptance thresholds. These results sug-
gest that— unlike in blindfolded ultimatum bargaining—proposers anticipate how
responders’ payoﬀs are aﬀected by v values and therefore adjust their price oﬀers
accordingly.
Supplementing this with our findings for scenario B, we state
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Result 4. In informed ultimatum bargaining, an increase of the q−level as well as
of value v has a significantly positive eﬀect on price oﬀers and acceptance thresholds.
In blindfolded ultimatum bargaining, an increase of the q−level has a significantly
positive eﬀect on acceptance thresholds only.
Regarding risk aversion, Hypothesis 7a predicts that, since participants are informed
about the size of the pie via v, risk aversion should not aﬀect their decisions. Mirror-
ing our earlier analysis, we estimate an OLS model including the interaction terms
discussed earlier. Table 8 reports our results which confirm this prediction.
(I) (II)
Variable Coeﬃcient (Std. Err.) Coeﬃcient (Std. Err.)
q 1.227∗∗∗ (0.264) -7.170 (5.254)
q = 0.45 1.522 (1.871)
q = 0.55 1.200 (1.563)
RISK -0.014 (1.317) 0.132 (2.376)
PROP -1.962 (1.858) -1.077 (1.461)
RISK∗q = 0.45 0.228 (2.004)
RISK∗q = 0.55 1.454 (1.659)
RISK∗PROP -0.997 (2.532)
FEMALE -1.579 (2.039) -1.561 (2.045)
Constant 31.684∗∗∗ (1.793) 32.561∗∗∗ (1.580)
Observations 3915 3915
R2 0.006 0.006
Significance levels : ∗ 10% ∗∗ 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ 1%
Standard errors clustered at subject level
Table 8: Eﬀect of risk aversion in scenario I (OLS)
Complementing this finding with the reported results for blindfolded ultimatum
bargaining, we find strong support for Hypothesis 7a and state
Result 5. Risk aversion aﬀects behavior only in case of blindfolded ultimatum bar-
gaining, i.e., when participants are not informed about the size of the pie.
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4.3. Becoming informed about the surplus from trade: The transition from sce-
nario B to scenario I
Hypothesis 5 predicts that the transition from scenario B to scenario I increases
price oﬀers and acceptance thresholds for high v values (v > 50) but decreases both
variables for low v values (v ≤ 50). In this latter case proposers’ willingness to pay
decreases as their gains from trade, v −BP , decrease with v; responders, however,
are willing to sell the low-valued commodity at a lower price and therefore reduce
their acceptance thresholds.
In a first step, we investigate the impact of becoming informed about v on proposer
versus responder behavior. To evaluate the eﬀect of the within-subject transition
from blindfolded to informed ultimatum bargaining, we estimate a linear fixed eﬀects
model including both within-subject treatment variations as explanatory variables:
a dummy variable INFO taking unit value for informed ultimatum bargaining and
zero value for blindfolded ultimatum bargaining as well as the q−level which varied
throughout the six rounds of the experiment. Estimation results are reported in
Table 9.
Price oﬀers BP Acceptance thresholds SP
Variable Coeﬃcient (Std. Err.) Coeﬃcient (Std. Err.)
q 7.614∗∗∗ (2.606) 17.697∗∗∗ (4.409)
INFO -9.342∗∗∗ (2.321) -9.491∗∗∗ (1.992)
Constant 37.118∗∗∗ (2.499) 34.862∗∗∗ (2.772)
Observations 1968 2208
R2 0.013 0.019
Significance levels : ∗ 10% ∗∗ 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ 1%
Robust standard errors
Table 9: Eﬀect of becoming informed on price oﬀers and acceptance thresholds (fixed eﬀects)
Estimation results in Table 9 report that q−levels have a significantly positive ef-
fect on price oﬀers and acceptance thresholds, whereas becoming informed has a
significantly negative eﬀect.
Hypothesis 5 predicts that this eﬀect is contingent on value v: becoming informed
about v induces higher price oﬀers and acceptance thresholds whenever v > 50,
whereas for v ≤ 50, becoming informed induces lower price oﬀers and acceptance
thresholds. To investigate this empirically, we reestimate the fixed eﬀects model for
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observations with v ≤ 50 (Table 10, column I) and v > 50 (Table 10, column II)
separately. As the eﬀect of becoming informed is identically negative for proposers
and responders (see Table 9), we report results for both jointly, i.e., the dependent
variable in our estimations is participants’ choice level (price oﬀer or acceptance
threshold).9
v ≤ 50 v > 50
Variable Coeﬃcient (Std. Err.) Coeﬃcient (Std. Err.)
q -21.752∗∗∗ (3.314) 35.520∗∗∗ (3.078)
INFO -25.459∗∗∗ (1.606) 8.636∗∗∗ (1.584)
Constant 51.539∗∗∗ (2.177) 25.767∗∗∗ (1.874)
Observations 2349 2088
R2 0.415 0.102
Significance levels : ∗ 10% ∗∗ 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ 1%
Robust standard errors
Table 10: Eﬀect of becoming informed, distinguishing high versus low v values (fixed eﬀects)
As predicted, informed proposers (responders) choose lower price oﬀers (acceptance
thresholds) whenever the value v—reflecting the size of the pie—is low, whereas
they choose higher price oﬀers (acceptance thresholds) for high values of v. These
findings support Hypothesis 5 and we state
Result 6. Becoming informed about the size of the pie reduces price oﬀers and
acceptance thresholds in case of low values (v ≤ 50) and increases price oﬀers and
acceptance thresholds in case of high values (v > 50).
In fact, the separation of our decision data for high versus low values of v reveals
a diﬀering eﬀect of the q−level: if v is small, increasing q leads to a significant
reduction of price oﬀers and acceptance thresholds, whereas the predicted positive
eﬀect of q on price oﬀers and acceptance thresholds (see Hypothesis 3) prevails
only if v is high. This suggests that proposers choose lower price oﬀers for small v
to assure positive gains from trade, whereas responders—anticipating this—choose
lower acceptance thresholds to assure that bargaining is successful.
9Reported results are robust to estimating the fixed eﬀects model for proposers and responders
separately.
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Hypothesis 6 predicts that blindfolded ultimatum bargaining could lead to less suc-
cessful bargaining in that price oﬀers are more often below the acceptance thresh-
olds, implying no trade. To investigate this, we use actually matched pairs of
proposers and responders and estimate a probit model to investigate the eﬀect of
becoming informed on the probability that trade will take place.10 As participants
are informed about q in both scenarios, we include the q−level to test whether it
has a significant impact on the probability of successful bargaining. To test whether
risk attitude aﬀects the probability of trade, we further include the dummy variable
for individual risk aversion in the estimation. Table 11 reports estimation results.
Variable Coeﬃcient (Std. Err.)
q -0.645 (0.667)
INFO 0.403∗∗∗ (0.148)
RISK -1.764∗∗∗ (0.270)
RISK∗PROP 1.471∗∗∗ (0.443)
PROP -1.468∗∗∗ (0.376)
Constant 1.885∗∗∗ (0.403)
Observations 4176
Log-likelihood -2714.871
χ2(5) 75.708
∗∗∗
Significance levels : ∗ 10% ∗∗ 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ 1%
Standard errors clustered at subject level
Table 11: Probability of successful bargaining (probit)
As predicted, the probability of trade is aﬀected by participants becoming informed:
if proposers and responders know value v, the probability of successful bargaining
is significantly higher than in case of blindfolded ultimatum bargaining. Note that
this eﬀect contradicts the benchmark analysis, which suggests agreeing on trade
irrespective of the specific condition.
Result 7. Becoming informed about v increases the probability of successful bar-
gaining.
10As we dropped observations with non-monotonic risk preferences, it is possible that only one
participant out of a successful pair remained in our data. For this reason we have more price oﬀers
(N=1195) which led to successful bargaining than acceptance thresholds (N=1342). We control
for this imbalance by including the role dummy PROP .
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Responders’ valuation parameter q, however, has no eﬀect on the probability of
successful bargaining. This mirrors our earlier results that price oﬀers and accep-
tance thresholds (mostly) increase with responders’ valuation. As long as they do
so proportionally to each other, the probability of trade is left unaﬀected.
Concerning risk attitude we find an overall negative eﬀect of risk aversion on the
probability of successful bargaining. However, the interaction term RISK∗PROP
is significantly positive meaning that the eﬀect of risk aversion is role dependent:
while risk averse proposers have a significantly higher probability for successful
bargaining, risk averse responders have a significantly lower probability. Recall
from Hypothesis 7b that ‘failure-risk aversion’ leads proposers to choose higher
price oﬀers. The observed significantly higher probability of successful bargaining
for proposers is caused by higher price oﬀers suggesting that ‘failure-risk aversion’
drives proposers’ decisions. Recall from Hypothesis 7c that ‘loss-risk aversion’ leads
responders to choose higher acceptance thresholds. The observed significantly lower
probability of successful bargaining for responders is caused by higher acceptance
thresholds hinting at ‘loss-risk aversion’ driving responders’ decisions.
We summarize these findings in
Result 8. Risk aversion has a significantly positive eﬀect on the probability of suc-
cessful bargaining, i.e., failure-risk aversion overcompensates loss-risk aversion.
Supplementing this with our finding that risk attitude has an insignificant eﬀect
in scenario I where proposers and responders are informed about the size of the
pie, there is no doubt that information about the size of the pie is essential for the
probability of successful ultimatum bargaining: while becoming informed directly
increases the probability of successful bargaining it additionally oﬀsets the negative
impact of risk aversion on successfully bargaining.
Comparing the frequencies with which participants choose the ‘benchmark,’ ‘equal
sharing,’ or ‘golden mean’ strategies (see Tables 2 and 6), it seems that the fre-
quency of ϵ-optimal choices increases when becoming informed, whereas the behav-
ioral strategies ‘equal sharing’ and ‘golden mean’ are implemented less often when
the size of the pie is known. This latter observation would provide support for
Hypothesis 8. To substantiate these descriptive findings we investigate the eﬀect
of becoming informed on the use of the three strategies. For this we implement a
dummy variable for each strategy, taking unit value whenever a chosen price oﬀer
or acceptance threshold lies within a 10%-range of the strategy-specific predicted
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values. Estimation results of the respective probit estimations are reported in Ta-
bles 12 to 14.
q = 0.35 q = 0.45 q = 0.55
Variable Coeﬃcient (Std. Err.) Coeﬃcient (Std. Err.) Coeﬃcient (Std. Err.)
INFO 0.768∗∗∗ (0.215) -0.183 (0.203) -0.118 (0.199)
PROP 0.060 (0.064) -0.080 (0.116) 0.165∗∗ (0.075)
Constant -1.608∗∗∗ (0.215) -1.363∗∗∗ (0.208) -1.342∗∗∗ (0.187)
Observations 1392 1392 1392
Log-likelihood -686.817 -308.309 -404.772
χ2(2) 15.226
∗∗∗ 1.242 5.128∗
Significance levels : ∗ 10% ∗∗ 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ 1%
Standard errors clustered at subject level
Table 12: Treatment eﬀect on ϵ-optimal choices (probit)
q = 0.35 q = 0.45 q = 0.55
Variable Coeﬃcient (Std. Err.) Coeﬃcient (Std. Err.) Coeﬃcient (Std. Err.)
INFO -0.506∗∗∗ (0.156) -0.292 (0.180) -0.753∗∗∗ (0.165)
PROP -0.264∗∗ (0.103) -0.237∗∗ (0.109) -0.062 (0.115)
Constant -0.784∗∗∗ (0.176) -1.040∗∗∗ (0.185) -0.709∗∗∗ (0.159)
Observations 1392 1392 1392
Log-likelihood -403.116 -380.652 -371.601
χ2(2) 13.971
∗∗ 6.927∗∗ 21.063∗∗
Significance levels : ∗ 10% ∗∗ 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ 1%
Standard errors clustered at subject level
Table 13: Treatment eﬀect on equal sharing choices (probit)
As proposed by our descriptive results, becoming informed has a significantly pos-
itive eﬀect on the use of the benchmark strategy, but only for a low q−level (q =
0.35). The significant eﬀect of the PROP dummy, indicating whether a participant
is in the role of a proposer or responder, for q = 0.55 oﬀers a possible explana-
tion for this restriction: responders trying to avoid negative payoﬀs choose higher
acceptance thresholds in reaction to high q−levels—countervailing the information-
induced move towards (lower) ϵ-optimal price oﬀers and acceptance thresholds.
Further, we find that becoming informed decreases the use of the equal sharing
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strategy.11 Lastly, the golden mean strategy is used significantly less often, as pro-
posed. These findings support Hypothesis 8 and suggest that information about
the size of the pie induces participants to focus attention on the experimental task
rather than to rely on task-independent behavioral strategies like the golden mean
or equal sharing. We state
Result 9. Becoming informed about the size of the pie decreases the use of the
task-independent behavioral strategies ‘equal sharing’ and ‘golden mean.’
q = 0.35 q = 0.45 q = 0.55
Variable Coeﬃcient (Std. Err.) Coeﬃcient (Std. Err.) Coeﬃcient (Std. Err.)
INFO -0.356∗∗ (0.165) -0.686∗∗∗ (0.134) -0.361∗∗ (0.143)
PROP 0.080 (0.128) 0.057 (0.089) -0.026 (0.073)
Constant -0.815∗∗∗ (0.159) -0.304∗∗ (0.146) -0.583∗∗∗ (0.146)
Observations 1392 1392 1392
Log-likelihood -546.306 -648.343 -644.771
χ2(2) 4.67
∗∗∗ 26.908∗∗∗ 6.606∗∗
Significance levels : ∗ 10% ∗∗ 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ 1%
Standard errors clustered at subject level
Table 14: Treatment eﬀect on golden mean choices (probit)
5. Conclusion
Our analysis of how information aﬀects ultimatum bargaining for a random pie
suggests one main finding, namely that proposer and responder behavior signif-
icantly depends on their information: experimental results significantly diﬀer be-
tween blindfolded (both parties are uninformed) and informed ultimatum bargaining
(both parties are informed). The transition from the first to the second scenario
reflects an important institutional change, e.g., when markets mature and the values
of commercial firms, active on such markets, become commonly known.
Our findings add new insights regarding the role of information in ultimatum bar-
gaining: informed participants use the available information to make task-dependent
decisions as suggested by the relatively higher use of (nearly) optimal choices whereas
uninformed participants more often implement task-independent strategies like equal
11The coeﬃcient of the INFO dummy is highly significant for the highest and lowest q−levels,
but insignificant for q = 0.45 (p-value=0.106).
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sharing or the golden mean. Participants’ risk attitude significantly influences be-
havior only in blindfolded ultimatum bargaining: becoming informed renders its
eﬀect insignificant.
When blindfolded, proposers and responders are more cautious choosing higher
price oﬀers and acceptance thresholds. While this suggests that proposers try to
ensure successful bargaining, such behavior could also be driven by proposers’ an-
ticipation of the cautious and therefore higher acceptance thresholds of responders
trying to limit the risk of negative payoﬀs. Becoming informed decreases price
oﬀers and acceptance thresholds, whereas the frequency of successful bargaining
increases. Furthermore, while uninformed choices of proposers and responders are
adjusted to responders’ valuation of the pie, blindfolded choices are adjusted only
by responders, even though valuations are common knowledge. The latter finding
could be explained by loss averse subjects: including loss aversion in their expected
utilities, highly loss averse responders could increase their acceptance thresholds in
order to avoid losses. Loss averse proposers, however, anticipating higher respon-
der thresholds, rather leave their price oﬀers unchanged because higher price oﬀers
would decrease expected payoﬀs without substantially decreasing loss probabilities,
while decreasing price oﬀers would increase loss probability.12
Risk attitude, as expected, aﬀects behavior only in blindfolded ultimatum bar-
gaining where its eﬀect depends on responders’ valuation. Overall, risk aversion
decreases the probability of successful bargaining suggesting that risk averse pro-
posers and responders mainly try to reduce the risk of negative payoﬀs rather than
the risk of unsuccessful bargaining.
Much of the ultimatum game literature is dedicated to the analysis of other-regarding
concerns for reward allocation between proposer and responder. Especially fairness
concerns are identified as having substantial implications (see, e.g., Hoﬀman et al.,
1996). We contribute to this literature by pointing out that information about the
pie size aﬀects the impact of fairness concerns: for blindfolded bargaining part-
ners fairness concerns are even more pronounced as participants—in lack of other
orientation—quite often share expected payoﬀs equally.
In settings with asymmetric information where either the proposer or the responder
is informed about the pie size, the uninformed participant is unaware of what their
bargaining partner receives. Becoming informed then induces more equal sharing of
12We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out the potential role of loss aversion in explaining
our results.
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the pie than with one-sided information, i.e., price oﬀers and acceptance thresholds
increase (see, e.g., Croson, 1996). At first sight this seems to contradict our finding
that equal sharing is used less when becoming informed. However, one has to keep
in mind that we assume both, proposer and responder (rather than only one of
them), to be uninformed before becoming informed. That is, neither player can
exploit superior information in the uninformed setting, whereas with asymmetric
information the better informed can choose an unequal oﬀer without this being
noticed by his bargaining partner, what allows for one party exploiting the other.
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Appendix
A. Experimental instructions
General information
Thank you for participating in this experiment. Please remain silent and turn oﬀ
your mobile phones. Please read the instructions carefully and note that they are
identical for each participant. From now on, you may not talk to other participants.
In case you do not follow these rules, we will have to exclude you from the experi-
ment as well as from any payment. You will receive 5 euros for participating in this
experiment. The participation fee and any additional amount of money you will
earn during the experiment will be paid out to you in cash at the end of the session.
All participants will be paid individually, i.e., no other participant will know how
much you earned. All monetary amounts in the experiment will be paid in ECU
(experimental currency units). At the end, all earned ECUs will be converted into
euros using the following exchange rate:
6 ECU = 1 euro.
Procedure
The experiment consists of the following parts: control questions, six rounds divided
into two stages, and a final questionnaire. Before starting the first stage, three prac-
tice rounds will be held. After completing stage 1, you will receive the instructions
for the second stage. At the beginning of the experiment, each participant is ran-
domly assigned one out of two possible roles. One half of the participants will be
assigned the role of a buyer, B; the other half will be assigned the role of a seller, S.
You will remain in the role you have been assigned throughout the experiment, i.e.,
in stage 1 and stage 2.
At the end of the experiment, for each of the six rounds, one of your decisions is
selected to determine your payment, i.e., one decision per round. If you suﬀer a loss
in the six selected decisions, you can pay for it in cash or balance it by completing
additional tasks at the end of the experiment. Please note that these tasks can
only be used to compensate for possible losses, but not to increase your earnings.
Additionally, you will receive a payment for one task from the questionnaire part.
Hence, you will receive the participation fee and payment for the questionnaire part
in any case.
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Detailed description of the experiment
The experiment consists of two stages, each consisting of three rounds.
The procedure of a round in stage 1 is structured as follows:
1. The computer randomly selects 15 values of v between 0 and incl. 100 (v =
0, 1, ..., 100). In this case, each value v between 0 and 100 can be selected with
equal probability.
2. Decisions of the participants.
The participant in role B chooses a buying price BP between 0 and incl. 100
(0 ≤ BP ≤ 100).
The participant in role S chooses a minimum selling price SP between 0 and incl.
100 (0 ≤ SP ≤ 100).
In each of the three rounds of stage 1, the randomly selected value of v is not an-
nounced to the participants. The uninformed participants only make one decision
per round: participants in role S decide to which minimum selling price SP they
would be willing to sell, and the participants in role B determine the buying price
BP at which they would be willing to buy.
If the buying price BP oﬀered by B is less than the minimum selling price SP oﬀered
by seller S, no sale takes place and no gains from the trade are generated, i.e., the
earnings of S and B are 0.
If the buying price BP oﬀered by B is higher than or equal to the minimum selling
price SP, seller S accepts the bid made by buyer B, and the following earnings result
from these choices:
The buyer receives the random value v minus the oﬀered buying price BP.
The seller receives the buying price BP proposed by B minus a share in the amount
of x% of the random value v.
The amount of x% varies in the three rounds of a stage and can either correspond
to 35%, 45%, or 55%, while the sequence of these three x-values is determined
randomly.
Therefore, the earnings in the event of a trade can be summarized as follows:
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B receives (v −BP ),
S receives (BP − x%v),
where x% may correspond to either 35%, 45%, or 55%.
Please note that profits from the sale are only positive for both participants – buyer
B and seller S – if the randomly selected value v is higher than buying price BP
and this, in turn, is higher than x% v (v > BP > x%v).
If v is less than BP, buyer B receives a negative payoﬀ due to the purchase. If BP
is less than x% v, seller S receives a negative payoﬀ due to the sale.
Therefore, seller S owns a good that has value v for buyer B but is less valuable for
the latter, namely x% of value v. Depending on buying price BP, on x%, and on
value v, it can be advantageous for S to sell to B.
You will receive the instructions for stage 2 at the end of stage 1.
Before stage 1 of the experiment begins, we will ask you to answer a few control
questions to help you better understand the rules of the experiment. This will be
followed by practice rounds to become familiar with the structure of the experiment.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR STAGE 2
In each of the three rounds of stage 2, both participants (in role S and B) are
confronted with 15 values of v randomly drawn by the computer. Participants in
role B decide on a buying price BP for each of the 15 values of v1, v2, ..., v15, and
participants in role S choose a minimum selling price SP for each of the 15 values.
At the end of the experiment, one of these values v is randomly selected for each
round and then used to determine the earnings of sellers S and buyers B as in stage
1. The diﬀerence to stage 1 consists only in the fact that you make your decisions
knowing the 15 diﬀerent values of v in each of the three rounds -– instead of not
knowing the value of v.
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B. Random order of v values and q−levels
Random order of q−levels in phase 1 (blindfolded ultimatum bargaining)
Round q−level
1 0.55
2 0.35
3 0.45
Random order of v values and q−levels in phase 2 (informed ultimatum bargaining)
v value 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
Round 1 (q = 0.45) 18 19 75 24 76 23 73 27 97 1 62 51 93 85 18
Round 2 (q = 0.55) 99 22 37 60 62 1 38 3 7 91 93 3 64 87 27
Round 3 (q = 0.35) 19 43 38 38 77 26 21 96 64 87 17 79 46 32 94
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